Illustration: Peter C.Espina/GT

 

　　Right after the dust had settled in the election of the upper house of Japan's National Diet, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, whose bloc won the election by a large margin, paid another visit to Southeast Asia. 

　　Abe visited Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines in late July. The three-day trip covers a series of strategic plans and orientations.

　　Generally, Japan is strengthening its relations with Southeast Asia for the purpose of containing China.

　　This year marks the 40th anniversary of Japan establishing a friendly relationship with ASEAN.

　　Japan is using this catalytic moment to hone its ties with ASEAN countries.

　　It also constitutes a major link in Abe's economic diplomacy, aimed at boosting Japan's national economy. Japan joined the TPP free trade talks in Malaysia two days before Abe's departure. By making use of this opportunity to fuel the confidence of the Japanese delegation at the talks, Abe tries to display the stances of the Japanese government to the rest of the world.

　　Abe also vigorously sells his "values diplomacy" to Southeast Asian countries in order to ask for a joint effort to tackle China's "threat." Ideology can serve to "encircle" China. Japan does not resort to this philosophy on a whim. Its diplomatic orientation requires it.

　　After the end of the Cold War, Japan's three-principled foreign policy was gradually narrowed into a one-principled and US-oriented policy.

　　As the international order was greatly changed when the Soviet Union broke apart, Japan has been continuing to stick to and consolidate its alliance with the US.

　　But in the meantime, it is also trying to expand a new horizon through "values diplomacy." This new diplomatic philosophy has affected a rising China in recent years, which has already been set as one of the major targets for Japan's diplomatic activities.

　　The success of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the upper house election is crucial to whether the Abe administration can stabilize and reverse the rapid turnovers of prime ministers since Junichiro Koizumi.

　　The overwhelming result of the election paved a smooth road for Abe to carry out his three-pronged political, strategic, and economic approach.

　　Breaking the curse of being "Mr. One-year" gives Abe the room and freedom to carry forward his China policy.

　　Abe made a new gesture during his Southeast Asian visit, calling for a high-level meeting between Japan and China with no preconditions.

　　Abe has realized that a blindly tough attitude toward China is deviating from Japan's essential and long-term interests.

　　It is possible that in the macro environment where China and Japan are still undergoing political estrangement, both countries will find opportunities to mildly ease tensions.

　　In general, Abe's China policy is subject to a complicated triadic structure which is made up of the domestic elements of Japan, interactions between China and Japan, and the external forces.

　　The crux lies in when more stakeholders are getting involved in the decision-making process, and whether their different desires to share interests in Sino-Japanese relations can be balanced.

　　The problems facing both China and Japan in terms of values, sovereignty claims and national interests are increasingly explicit.

　　Effective interactions between both countries are key to whether these problems can be addressed in a proper way.

　　Negative elements impeding the development of Sino-Japanese relations are still empowering these problems and making them hard to be resolved.

　　These elements are mainly the conservatives in the LDP that aim to "normalize" Japan by amending its current constitution and encircling China within a well-knit fence.

　　For the future relationship between China and Japan, grave challenges are still waiting ahead.